FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Kristina Baum – 202.224.6176 Donelle Harder – 202.224.1282
Senate
Republicans Urge Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Restore Established Order
WASHINGTON,
DC – U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), chairman of the U.S. Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee, with Sens. David Vitter (R-La.), John Barrasso
(R-Wyo.), Shelley Moore Capito (R-W. Va.), Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), John Boozman
(R-Ark.), Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), and Mike Rounds (R-S. Dak.) wrote a letter to
request the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) return to regular order.
“We
believe the time has come for the NRC to integrate any remaining post-Fukushima
items into the agency’s ongoing work and prioritize the work according to its
safety significance. The only way to ensure this is to return to “regular
order” while utilizing established agency processes, disciplined regulatory
analyses, and rigorous cost-benefit analyses,” the Republicans said in the letter.
The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear industry are implementing safety
enhancements that range from reassessing the risks of earthquakes and floods to
compensating for a loss of offsite power supply and mitigating the effects of
extreme natural disasters. This work has been in addition to the NRC’s
and the industry’s efforts to ensure all U.S. nuclear plants operate safely
every day. As the post-Fukushima safety enhancements near full
implementation, it’s time for lower priority matters to be scrutinized
alongside other safety matters to ensure that NRC and industry resources are
focused on the matters that yield the greatest safety benefits. The best
way to do that is for NRC to return to regular order and stick to its
disciplined internal processes for technical and cost benefit analyses.
In COMSECY-14-0037, “Integration of Mitigating Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Re-Evaluation of Flooding Hazards”,
the NRC staff recommendations to the Commission are in line with this
approach.
“The
NRC and the nuclear industry have undertaken significant safety improvements
since the tragic accident at Fukushima nearly four years ago. The time
has come for the NRC to return to regular order and rely on its disciplined
processes for distinguishing between necessary safety enhancements and
regulatory burden that merely sounds good,” said Chairman Inhofe.
The full
text of the letter is as follows:
March 3, 2015
The Honorable Stephen G. Burns
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852
Dear Chairman Burns:
We are writing to endorse the staff’s recommended approach
in COMSECY-14-0037, “Integration of Mitigating Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Re-Evaluation of Flooding Hazards”,
dated November 21, 2014. In addition, we believe the time has come for
the NRC to integrate any remaining post-Fukushima issues into the agency’s
ongoing work, focusing on matters yielding the greatest safety benefits.
Nearly four years have passed since the Fukushima accident
in Japan. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) response has
resulted in a vast undertaking that has consumed significant agency and
industry resources. Most of this work has been focused on issues the
Commission believed to be in the top tier of importance, the so-called Tier One
items, but also incorporates many Tier Two items as well. We are pleased
to see that implementation of these safety enhancements appears to be on
schedule for completion in 2016. This is a significant achievement for
the NRC, reflecting the expertise and hard work of thousands of people within
the agency. As a result, our nation’s nuclear plants have achieved a new
height of safety, yet another testament to the NRC’s reputation as the gold
standard for nuclear safety world-wide.
While these changes have been important, they should no
longer be viewed as distinct from safety work that is unrelated to the NRC’s
post-Fukushima response. Any future regulatory changes must be focused on
the most safety-significant matters, regardless of their origin. Given
that work on the most safety-significant, post-Fukushima items has shifted into
implementation, the remaining post-Fukushima items are those with
lower safety significance. We believe the time has come for the NRC
to integrate any remaining post-Fukushima items into the agency’s ongoing work
and prioritize the work according to its safety significance. The only
way to ensure this is to return to “regular order” while utilizing established
agency processes, disciplined regulatory analyses, and rigorous cost-benefit
analyses.
While several lessons learned from Fukushima have yielded
safety enhancements, we ask the Commission to learn yet one more lesson.
It is a lesson that came out of the NRC’s response to the Three Mile Island
accident and a reminder the NRC’s Near-Term Task Force gave
the Commission in their report following Fukushima:
“…the post-TMI review considered a number of actions that were proposed for
general safety enhancement rather than being directed at specific safety
weaknesses revealed by the TMI accident. As a result, some of the actions
taken by the NRC after TMI were not subjected to a structured review and were
subsequently not found to be of substantial safety benefit and were removed.”
The importance of structured reviews is illustrated in the
NRC’s handling of external filters for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) following
the Fukushima accident. On November 26, 2012, the NRC staff recommended
the Commission issue an order requiring 31 BWRs install external filters even
though the proposal wasn’t found to be cost-beneficial.[1]
This cost-benefit analysis was later criticized by the Government
Accountability Office as “…not reliable because it did not sufficiently
follow related best practices to fully or substantially meet any of the four
characteristics of a reliable cost estimate.”[2]
Despite this shortcoming, the staff justified their recommendation based on
consideration of qualitative factors.
On February 4, 2013, seven members of this Committee wrote
to the Commission raising concerns about this issue, and the need for the NRC
to fully understand the impact of any new regulatory changes.[3] The Commission,
rightfully, subjected the issue of external filters to a rulemaking, thus
requiring a rigorous regulatory analysis. According to Inside NRC, the
first step in this analysis reportedly shows the external filter requirement
would not substantially increase health and safety and the NRC staff is
now expected to recommend ending the rulemaking on the filtration requirement.[4] One NRC staff person was quoted
in the article saying:
“In the first proposal to
the commission, we had not done the detailed analyses we have been able to do
over the last few years. And we have found that, in fact, what we had
estimated in terms of a substantial safety increase have not been proven by the
best science available to us.”
The agency’s actions regarding external filters is, once
again, a stark reminder that disciplined regulatory and cost benefit analysis
provide a basis for distinguishing between matters that are truly
safety-significant and those that merely appear so. This is a clear
example of why the NRC must subject any remaining post-Fukushima items to
scrutiny under the agency’s established processes and return to regular order.
The Commission has an opportunity to demonstrate its
recognition of this lesson with its consideration of COMSECY 14-0037: “Integration
of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the
Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards.” The NRC staff’s proposal in
COMSECY 14-0037 appropriately recognizes that any newly reevaluated hazards
should be treated as a beyond-design-basis matter until a full regulatory
analysis is completed in accordance with the NRC’s “Backfit Rule”:
“NRC
Order EA-12-049 requires nuclear power plant licensees to put in place
mitigating strategies for a variety of beyond-design-basis external events,
including flooding. The NRC staff plans to incorporate these requirements into
NRC regulations through the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events (MBDBE)
rulemaking. This approach ensures that licensees implement additional
capabilities for dealing with the reevaluated flooding hazards….. There is also
a possibility that circumstances at some nuclear power plants may warrant
consideration of additional measures to protect against or mitigate postulated
flooding scenarios. These additional measures (beyond those imposed by Order
EA-12-049 and the related MBDBE rulemaking) could be pursued voluntarily by licensees
or imposed by the NRC through the process defined in 10 CFR 50.109,
“Backfitting.”
“The
NRC will address, as a separate matter from mitigating strategies, whether the
existing design basis and licensing basis for flooding of any nuclear power
plant continues to be acceptable if the re-evaluated flood hazard at any plant
is greater than the plant’s design basis and licensing basis. The NRC staff
will follow the established processes for imposing additional requirements on
licenses including Management Directive 8.4, “Management of Facility-specific
Backfitting and Information Collection,” which describe how to initiate,
review, and disposition these types of safety concerns.”
The Backfit Rule is of particular importance to ensure that
the NRC’s and the industry’s resources are focused on issues that will provide
the greatest safety benefit. The rigorous, quantitative technical and
cost benefit analyses inherent in the Backfit Rule are also essential to
observing the NRC’s Principles of Good Regulation: Efficiency, Clarity, and
Reliability. We applaud the staff for recommending adherence to these
established processes. While some NRC staff did not concur with this
approach, we are impressed with agency’s process for addressing disagreements
in a professional and transparent manner.
We request the Commission’s full support of the NRC staff’s
recommendations in COMSECY 14-0037 and request responses to the following
questions by March 20, 2015:
1.
Has the Commission met
to discuss how to best execute the orderly transition of its post-Fukushima
effort back into the statutorily mandated organization? If so, please tell us
about those plans and schedules.
2.
What agency mechanism
is now in place to periodically ensure that the post-Fukushima recommendations
are receiving the benefit of a comprehensive structured review, including risk
prioritization, to ensure the mistakes of the post-TMI era are not repeated?
3.
Without such
mechanisms to ensure proposed requirements receive a structured review and risk
prioritization, would you agree that the imposition of agency requirements
becomes more a matter of ad hoc, subjective decisions, and less a product of a
consistent, rigorous and risk informed consideration?
4.
How many of the
remaining post-Fukushima issues would likely be justified under rigorous,
quantitative technical and cost benefit analyses in accordance with the NRC’s
Backfit Rule?
5.
Please provide a list
of additional regulatory requirements imposed over the last five years that
have been outside the scope of the Backfit Rule.
6.
Please describe the
training and mentoring programs in the agency that emphasize commitment to the
Principles of Good Regulation, and empower managers to be guided by them.
Should you have any
questions, please contact Annie Caputo of the Majority staff at (202) 224-6176.
Sincerely,
###
[1] NRC SECY 12-0157: “Consideration of Additional
Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors with
MARK I and MARK II Containments”.
[2] Government Accountability Office: “Nuclear Regulatory
Commission: NRC Needs to Improve Its Cost Estimates by Incorporating More Best
Practices;” GAO-15-98.
[3]http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases-all?ID=a79c7514-cf71-9bab-769a-0f4d16587726&Region_id=&Issue_id=
[4] Inside NRC: “NRC Staff Close to Recommending End to BWR
Filtration Rulemaking”; Volume 36, Number 25; December 15, 2014.