Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling today’s hearing. I would also like to thank our witnesses for testifying before the Subcommittee on Water and Wildlife.

Standing alone, the June 16, 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement appears worthy of celebration. The Agreement establishes several laudable principles that are intended to serve as a framework for the continued work on the Chesapeake Bay Program. These principles include collaboration, transparency, science-based decision-making, and a pledge to work closely with local governments in pursuing Chesapeake Bay restoration efforts. Given these commitments, it may be difficult to imagine anyone having reservations about the Agreement, especially when one also considers that the Agreement is apparently a voluntary accord between the Chesapeake region states and the federal government.

However, the Agreement before the Subcommittee today cannot be examined in a vacuum. If we are to understand helpful ideas or potential hurdles to achieving the goals of the 2014 Agreement, we should be mindful of the history associated with past Chesapeake Bay agreements. In my opinion, and in light of the regulatory developments which occurred after the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement, any strategy regarding the 2014 Agreement deserves caution and careful deliberation.

The Chesapeake 2000 Agreement was similar to the 2014 Agreement before the Committee today. Like the 2014 Agreement, the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement contained voluntary commitments and goals for the protection and restoration of the Chesapeake Bay. Following this agreement, EPA in 2003 developed regional criteria guidance for water quality standards for the Chesapeake Bay. These criteria led several Chesapeake Bay states to adopt new water quality criteria, and between 2004 and 2006 the seven Chesapeake watershed jurisdictions committed to "Tributary Strategies" so that the Chesapeake Bay could meet water quality goals. Thanks to these cooperative efforts, which were supported by environmental groups, local governments, agricultural organizations, and other stakeholders, the Chesapeake Bay was well on its way to achieving the goals that had been established in the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement. In fact, as we know from U.S. Geological Survey research on the time lag between taking conservation measures and seeing water quality changes, the improvements we are seeing today are as a result of those voluntary efforts taken years ago.

But this collaborative progress was interrupted in 2009, when the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and other plaintiffs sued EPA, claiming that progress was too slow and the voluntary goals in the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement were in fact mandatory duties under the Clean Water Act. In other words, rather than a mutual commitment to work together on Chesapeake Bay restoration issues, the lawsuit painted the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement as containing inflexible standards which bound the Chesapeake states to a nonnegotiable mandate.

Unfortunately, even though the scientific evidence undercut the claims of lack of progress, the Obama Administration acquiesced to this counterproductive approach. In a highly questionable 2010 "sue and settle" agreement that ended the CBF litigation, EPA agreed to establish a Total Maximum Daily Load (Bay TMDL) for nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment flow into the Chesapeake Bay. But when EPA finalized the Bay TMDL later in 2010, the final product was an unprecedented federal regulation that could not have been envisioned when the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement was signed. EPA’s TMDL is a costly command and control mechanism that deprives state and local governments of their traditional land use decision-making authority. EPA has purported to dictate not only the total amount of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment that can flow into the Chesapeake Bay, but, by allocating those loads in excruciating detail and crediting only the load reduction actions that are included in its Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model, EPA also dictated the manner in which individual companies and sectors within the economy must comply with the total load limitations.

EPA’s Bay TMDL has enormous repercussions for private landowners, small businesses, and local governments throughout the Chesapeake Bay region. According to the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, implementation of the Bay TMDL could cost as much as $50 billion between 2010 and 2025. Left unchecked, the TMDL could represent a national precedent that would force state and local officials across the country to cede their land use authority to EPA. These concerns led me to sign on to an amicus brief with several other members of Congress urging the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to invalidate this intrusive regulation.

The lesson of the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement and Bay TMDL is that certain groups and organizations are all too willing to turn a cooperative agreement into a federal mandate, by whatever means necessary. As Peyton Robertson, the Director of the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration’s Chesapeake Bay Office who is here as a witness today, once said, the Bay TMDL "fundamentally altered the nature" of the Chesapeake Bay Program, noting that "[y]ou can’t reasonably argue that it is a voluntary approach anymore."

Thus, although the June 16, 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement is nominally voluntary, certain questions must be asked with the understanding that history tends to repeat itself. For example, by establishing the Agreement, have the states inadvertently laid the groundwork for a future lawsuit against EPA? Would EPA settle such a future lawsuit by forcing state and local officials to devote more of their limited resources towards unfunded federal mandates? To what extent does this Agreement impede current voluntary efforts towards Chesapeake Bay restoration?

I am glad there will be a robust discussion of these issues, and I appreciate Senator Cardin holding this hearing today. I also would like to thank Maryland State Senator Stephen Hershey for serving as a minority witness. Senator Hershey understands firsthand how federal regulation can affect the land use decision-making authority of state and local officials. I look forward to the testimony of Senator Hershey and our other witnesses.

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