Relying on rhetoric and distortion of fact, anti-nuclear energy activists lobbied Time magazine to their cause this week. The Time article, which prominently featured political special interests from the Union of Concerned Scientists to the Committee to Bridge the Gap – groups well-known for opposing any expansion or use of nuclear energy, paints a dim, but inaccurate picture of the plants’ current state of security. Fact: Security at these facilities is as robust as any industrial structure in the world and is the model for infrastructure security. Further enhancements can be made by providing additional authorities to the NRC, and provisions in legislation offered by Senators Inhofe and Voinovich that was recently reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee by unanimous consent would accomplish that mission. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is ensuring the security profile at facilities meets potential threats. In fact, the NRC has been seeking additional authorities for security for several years –authorities that can only be granted through legislation and have stalled with the Energy Bill. Virtually every member of Congress who was interviewed by Time is known to be an opponent of nuclear energy and opposed the bill. Time failed to speak with members who embrace the future of nuclear energy for all its benefits and have authored legislation to improve nuclear power plant security with an eye toward that future. Since 9/11, well over $1 billion has been spent to upgrade security at nuclear power plants – an enormous figure when one considers the extraordinary security that already existed prior to 9/11 and the fact this money is being spent at on 64 sites. By comparison, $20 billion has been spent to cover security at more than 18,000 airports nationwide, including 540 commercial service airports and more than 7,800 commercial planes. Environmental special interests who oppose nuclear power are using security as their latest red herring in opposing this energy source. Overnight, environmental groups became experts in national security and the press has too often come to rely on that “expertise.” Under the guise of trying to make America’s nuclear power plants safer, anti-nuclear energy groups are attempting to scare American’s into abandoning any use of nuclear energy. Time’s report also relies on commentary from individuals who are not security experts, and because of its sensitive nature, either would not be privy to or be able provide information that would paint an honest picture. Certainly more can and should be done to secure America’s nuclear power plants, but Americans should be comforted that with decades of innovation and technological advances already behind us, safe, clean nuclear power can and will be an important component of a sound energy policy that will enhance our energy security and reduce pollution. S. 864, The Nuclear Security Act of 2005, accomplishes the following: Ø Authorizes the NRC to allow security guards to possess more powerful weapons (machineguns, semiautomatic, assault weapons, etc.) when they are engaged in the protection of NRC-licensed or NRC-certified facilities. The purpose is to provide licensees and certificate holders, their employees and contractors the ability to possess the weapons they need to effectively protect facilities, equipment, and radioactive materials. Ø Amends current law requiring that NRC conduct security evaluations at each licensed facility at least once every three years. The security evaluations must include force-on-force exercises that simulate security threats, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with the applicable design basis threat. This provision requires the NRC to initiate a rulemaking to revise the design basis threat (DBT) within 90 days of enactment of this section. It is to be completed 18 months after that date. NRC is also required to address any potential conflict of interest that may influence the results of the exercise. Ø Expands requirement for fingerprinting for criminal history record checks. Those required for fingerprinting include any individual permitted unescorted access to a utilization facility, access to safeguards information, or permitted unescorted access to radioactive material or other property subject to NRC regulation that the Commission determines to be of significance to the common defense or public health and safety. Ø Prohibits a person who has not obtained prior authorization from carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrumentality into any facility, installation, or real property regulated or subject to certification by the Commission. Ø Expands existing federal criminal sanctions for sabotage or attempted sabotage of production or utilization facilities during the construction stage of those facilities, if the damage could affect public health and safety during facility operation. Ø Requires the NRC to issue regulations to control the international import and export of radiation sources in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Code of Conduct for Category 1 and 2 sources. NRC is also required to issue regulations to develop a domestic tracking system for discrete radiation sources and any other radioactive material that the NRC determines warrants protection in the United States.