STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. MESERVE,
CHAIRMAN
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OVERSIGHT HEARING
Dr. Meserve is accompanied by the NRC
Commissioners:
Hon. Greta Joy Dicus,
Hon. Nils J. Diaz,
Hon. Edward McGaffigan, Jr., and
Hon. Jeffrey S. Merrifield
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, and members of the
Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today with my fellow
Commissioners to discuss the Nuclear Regulatory Commission=s programs. We appreciate the past support that we have
received from the Subcommittee and the Committee as a whole, and we look
forward to working with you in the new Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that fiscal
year 2002 and the first four and one-half months of fiscal year 2003 have been
marked by significant achievements by our agency in the face of great
challenges. Let me enumerate a few of
our achievements and the challenges. I
will not go into great detail here because I submit a monthly report on our
activities to you and our other authorization and appropriations subcommittees.
Security
Over the past 17 months, the
Commission has undertaken a comprehensive review of safeguards and security
programs, in close consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and
other Federal agencies and with significant involvement by State agencies. Out of that review has come a series of
interim compensatory measures (ICMs) to strengthen nuclear security at power
reactors, Category I fuel cycle facilities, decommissioning reactors, research
and test reactors, independent spent fuel storage facilities, the two gaseous
diffusion plants, and the conversion facility, as well as in the transportation
of spent fuel. Last August we put in
place a five-tier threat advisory system compatible with the Homeland Security
Advisory System, and we have used that system twice, including just last week,
to improve security measures at our licensed facilities. We have issued Orders to strengthen our
access authorization programs at power reactors. We have drafted proposed Orders to strengthen guard training and
address guard fatigue. We have provided
revised design basis threats (DBTs) for comment to other Federal agencies, the
States and cleared industry personnel. We have been conducting enhanced table-top security exercises at
our reactor facilities and will by the end of this month begin enhanced
force-on-force exercises at these facilities.
We will conduct force-on-force exercises on a 3-year cycle and have requested
the resources to do this in our fiscal year 2004 budget. We have defined the actions that we need to
take to ensure better control of high risk radioactive sources containing
radioactive isotopes of the most concern for potential use in a radiological
dispersal device.
In short, we have a comprehensive
and aggressive program to enhance security.
Nuclear facilities had very significant security before September 11th
and that security has been greatly strengthened in the aftermath of the
attacks.
Reactor Safety Programs
The past 17 months have seen the
maturing of our new reactor oversight process.
We and most stakeholders believe
that this new program is a significant improvement over our old inspection,
enforcement and assessment processes. One
of its strongest factors is its transparency and accessibility to members of
the public. You will find on our web
page performance indicators and inspection findings for every power reactor, as
well as our current assessment of that reactor=s overall performance. The transition to the new process has gone remarkably well,
although it is still a work in progress on which we will make further
improvements.
Overall the industry has performed
very well. As of the end of 2002, there
was one plant designated for the highest level of scrutiny, the Cooper plant in
Nebraska, and one other plant, the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio, which is
effectively being treated similarly under our Manual Chapter 0350 restart
process. The Cooper plant has received
significant attention from both our Region IV and headquarters staffs, and we
are confident that it is on a path to resolving long-standing problems.
The Davis-Besse plant has been our
greatest recent challenge. Mr.
Chairman, you have followed this matter in detail and we have had meetings
about this. But let me try to summarize
the issues for your colleagues.
In February 2001, Duke Energy, the
licensee at the Oconee Nuclear Station, conducted a vessel head inspection at
its Unit 3. The vessel head is the very
large steel structure that serves as the top of the reactor pressure vessel. Duke found circumferential cracking in
several control rod drive mechanism penetration nozzles within the vessel
head. The NRC staff immediately
recognized the significance of these inspection findings -- the possibility of
the ejection of the control rod drive mechanism -- and initiated a series of actions to ensure that any similar
cracking would be promptly detected and repaired at other pressurized water
reactors.
The Davis-Besse plant was one which
the staff and the industry believed potentially had high susceptibility to such
cracking. The staff=s August 2001 bulletin called for
such plants to conduct vessel head inspections by December 31, 2001, unless a
later time could be justified.
Davis-Besse petitioned for additional time (until April 2002) to
complete the inspection. The staff
initially planned to issue a shutdown Order, but decided in November 2001 to
grant Davis-Besse a 46-day extension on the vessel head inspection
requirement. When Davis-Besse shut down
and conducted the required inspection, they found no through-wall
circumferential cracking in the CRDM penetration welds, but, as they began to
repair the axial cracks, they unexpectedly found a large cavity in the carbon
steel of the reactor head. The cavity
had been caused by corrosion due to the presence of boric acid.
This degradation was preventable,
and the licensee=s actions leading up to the
discovery of the corrosion in March 2002 are unacceptable. This discovery has led to investigations,
which are ongoing, of the licensee=s actions. It has
led us to focus large inspection resources on the facility as it seeks to
restart its reactor with a new vessel head.
It has also caused the Commission=s staff to focus on mistakes the NRC made in dealing with
boric acid corrosion issues in the 1990s.
In this connection, an internal lessons-learned task force has made a
comprehensive set of recommendations related to inspections, assessment of
operating experience, NRC staff training and experience, and the assessment of
stress corrosion cracking, boric acid corrosion, and barrier integrity requirements. The NRC staff is now developing action plans
to implement the highest priority recommendations on an aggressive
schedule. On Tuesday of this week NRC
issued orders to all 69 pressurized water reactor licensees outlining much
tougher vessel head inspection requirements than those previously required by
our regulations and by industry codes.
The Commission staff has devoted
significant resources to the Davis-Besse plant and to the broader issues raised
by the Davis-Besse incident.
Davis-Besse will only return to operation after the staff is convinced
through intensive inspections both that the plant is physically ready to
operate, and, perhaps more importantly, that the safety culture at the plant,
which the licensee has identified as the main root cause of this event, is on
the path to recovery.
Reactor Licensing Programs
Let me now turn to significant
achievements in our reactor licensing programs. Four reactors -- Hatch 1 and 2
in Georgia and Turkey Point 3 and 4 in Florida -- have had their licenses
renewed to operate for twenty additional years. That brings the total of renewed licenses to ten. The staff currently has license renewal
applications under review for twenty additional units. In every instance, the staff has met its
timeliness goals in carrying out the safety and environmental reviews required
by our regulations. This is truly a
remarkable achievement. Today we expect
almost all of the 104 reactors licensed to operate to apply for renewal of
their licenses. The staff will continue
to face an increasing workload in this area for the next several years as a bow
wave of license renewal applications are submitted (echoing the bow wave of
nuclear reactor construction in the 1970s).
The Commission also carefully reviews
requests to raise the maximum power level at which a plant may be
operated. These so-called power uprates
range from requests for small increases based on better flowmeter technology,
to large requests in the 15 to 20 percent range that require substantial
hardware modifications at the plants.
In all instances, staff must be satisfied that safety margins are
maintained. In 2001 and 2002, the NRC
approved 40 power uprates, which have added approximately 1800 megawatts
electric to the Nation=s generating capacity -- the
equivalent of two large power plants.
We expect a similar pace of uprates in the years ahead.
The staff has similarly processed a
series of license transfer applications that have allowed significant
consolidation within the nuclear power industry. Most of these transfers were processed within a 6-month target,
and, with one exception, the NRC was
not the last regulatory agency to grant the necessary approval.
The NRC staff is preparing for
potential new reactor and reactor design applications. The staff is on target to conduct a timely
review of the Westinghouse AP-1000 design certification. It is preparing to review three early site
permit requests expected later this year.
The staff is also in the pre-application phase in dealing with potential
design certifications for several additional reactor designs. And the staff is making infrastructure
improvements to prepare for a potential combined operating license request. These are resource-intensive activities, and
our fiscal year 2004 budget request provides for the necessary significant
growth to meet this challenge.
Materials Program
Mr. Chairman, the NRC in partnership
with thirty-two Agreement States also conducts a comprehensive program to
ensure the safe use of radiological materials in a variety of medical and
industrial settings.
In the last 17 months, the
Commission has completed a complex rulemaking on medical use of byproduct
material -- a rulemaking on which there was significant interaction with the
Congress. We now face the challenge of
implementing that rule and assuring that compatible regulations are adopted in
the thirty-two Agreement States.
The Commission has also been
implementing a major rule change relating to large fuel cycle facilities. This rule requires the submission of an
integrated safety assessment for all new licenses and license renewals that
applies risk insights to the regulation of these facilities. Several major licensing reviews underway or
soon to be submitted will test the new rule.
Substantial new construction of fuel cycle facilities is planned in the
near future, including a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility in South
Carolina as part of the Department of Energy=s program to dispose of excess weapons grade plutonium, as
well as two new gas centrifuge enrichment facilities, one in Tennessee proposed
by Louisiana Energy Services (LES) and one in Ohio proposed by U.S. Enrichment
Corporation. The staff is also
providing support to our Russian colleagues at Gosatomnadzor (GAN) regarding
the licensing of a Russian MOX facility, which will have an identical design to
the U.S. facility.
Nuclear Waste Programs
The Commission staff has made
progress on a wide array of programs relating to the safe disposal of nuclear
waste.
A central focus of this program is
the preparation for the Department of Energy=s (DOE=s) application to construct a
high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. That application is currently expected in
December 2004. Over the past year the
staff has issued a draft Yucca Mountain Review Plan for public comment and has
conducted numerous public meetings with DOE in anticipation of its application. Preparations are now underway for the
conduct of the licensing proceeding, including the creation of an information
technology system to handle the large number of complex documents that will be
involved. This licensing proceeding
will present the NRC with a formidable challenge. The technical issues involved will be substantial. Moreover, no single NRC decision or set of
decisions since the response to Three Mile Island accident is likely to be
scrutinized as closely as those concerning this one-of-a-kind facility.
Yucca Mountain is by no means the
sole activity in our waste program. The
Commission staff has a substantial effort underway in the area of dry cask
storage of spent reactor fuel. Storage
and transport casks continue to be certified.
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) continue to be
licensed. The Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board panel will soon issue its final decisions on the Private Fuel
Storage (PFS) ISFSI in Utah. And the
Surrey ISFSI in Virginia is the lead facility for ISFSI license renewal. Indeed, our workload related to ISFSIs and
dry cask storage in general will increase substantially in the years ahead
based on licensees= plans to adopt dry cask storage at
their sites. We also have a major research
program underway, the Package Performance Study (PPS), which will conduct
full-scale integrity tests of both truck and rail casks under stringent
conditions. The PPS test protocols are
being issued for public comment.
The NRC staff is also continuing to
make significant progress in decommissioning contaminated sites. The staff has identified several issues
requiring Commission attention, particularly in the area of making the
restricted release and institutional control provisions in our license termination
rule work in practice.
Human Capital
The NRC is very dependent on a
strong and capable work force for the effective execution of its
activities. The Commission=s human capital planning integrates
strategies for finding and attracting new staff, and for promoting employee
development, succession planning, and retention. In this connection, the Commission has developed and implemented
a strategic workforce planning system to identify and monitor its human capital
assets and needs. This includes the
development of an agency-wide online skills and competency system which is used
to identify gaps in needed skills and to address critical skills shortages;
the development of a restructuring
initiative to more closely align NRC=s organizational structure with its human capital goals; and
the development of a web-based vacancy announcement system that includes online
application, rating, ranking, and referral features. The agency has also implemented two leadership competency
development programs to select high-performing individuals and train them for
future mid-level and senior-level leadership positions. In addition, the agency has continued to
support its fellowship and scholarship programs and identified a significant
number of highly qualified entry level candidates through participation in
recruitment events and career fairs.
NRC is utilizing a variety of
incentives to remain competitive with the private sector. So far we have been successful in attracting
new staff, particularly at entry‑levels.
Nonetheless, it is likely to become more difficult for the Commission,
as for many Federal agencies, to hire and retain personnel with the knowledge,
skills, and abilities to conduct the safety reviews, licensing, research, and
oversight actions that are essential to our safety mission. Moreover, the number of individuals with the
technical skills critical to the achievement of the Commission=s safety mission is rapidly
declining in the Nation, and the educational system is not replacing them. The maintenance of technically competent
staff will continue to challenge governmental, academic, and industry entities
associated with nuclear technology for some time to come.
Budget
The NRC has proposed a Fiscal Year
2004 budget of $626.1 million. This
represents approximately a 7 percent ($41.1 million) increase over the Fiscal
Year 2003 budget. This budget proposal
will allow the NRC to continue to protect the public health and safety, promote
the common defense and security, and protect the environment, while providing
sufficient resources to address increasing personnel costs and increasing
workloads. Approximately 25 percent of
the budget growth is for personnel costs, primarily the pay raise that the
President has authorized for Federal employees. The remaining increase serves several other needs. First, the NRC=s proposed FY 2004 budget supports enhanced security
efforts to protect public safety and security.
Toward that end, the NRC is strengthening its safeguards and security programs
for nuclear reactors, other NRC-regulated facilities, and radioactive
materials. Second, the proposed budget
addresses the growing interest in building new nuclear power plants. It strengthens the capability of the NRC to
conduct reviews of new reactor designs and early site permit applications. Third, the budget enables the agency to
process the increasing flow of applications for license renewal. Finally, with Presidential and Congressional
approval of the proposed Yucca Mountain site for a HLW repository, the pace of
the NRC=s high-level waste program is
increasing, and the proposed budget enables the NRC to continue its
preparations for the license application that the U.S. Department of
Energy plans to submit in late 2004. In
short, we have important new work and there is strong justification for the
budget increase that we seek.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the NRC obviously has
many important initiatives underway.
This reflects the reality that we are in a time of striking change. Fortunately the NRC is up to the challenges
before it.
I have had the privilege of leading
the Commission for over 3 years. I can
tell you that I am proud of the people with whom I work. They are dedicated to ensuring the safe use
of nuclear technology for the benefit of the Nation. You will not find a more technically competent and hard-working
workforce in the Federal government.
Thanks to them the NRC has accomplished many milestones during my tenure
and will accomplish many more after I step down.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today. My colleagues and I
welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions.